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Executive Summary 
An independent Scotland would face immediate set-up costs of up to £200 million in creating new 
administrative structures that duplicate UK institutions, but could also streamline many public bodies. 
During the transition process, the Scottish government could agree contracts or service deals with 
London to maintain existing back office support system (mainly involving IT) in collecting taxes, paying 
benefits and organizing complex defence systems. In the medium term (by 2018 to 2021) Scotland would 
need to build its own, new IT systems to allow policy control to be fully exercised from Edinburgh, in each 
of these areas. These tasks would certainly cost several hundred million pounds, but they would also be 
investments in modern systems, and not just “set up” costs. Significant policy savings may also accrue, 
and offset some of this burden. 
A key influence on Scotland’s costs would be the conduct of negotiations between Scottish ministers and 
the remaining UK (rUK) government. A hostile approach by London ministers would force rapid changes 
and greatly add to Scotland’s costs. A more careful, phased approach would make these costs a lot less.  
Every transition to a new state has some uncertainty and a degree of risk. But there are no bases for 
extreme anxiety about an independence transition in Scotland. The Scottish government’s record in 
public management is a good one, its published plans for transition are relatively specific and reasonable, 
and the long-run viability of a Scottish state looks strong. The main current uncertainties arise from the 
London government’s apparent reluctance to do any planning for, or to make clear to Scottish voters, 
how a transition to independence would be handled at their end.  
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On 18 September this year, voters in Scotland face a momentous choice. Much of the discussion has been 
dominated by questions of economics, with bodies such as the London-based Institute for Fiscal Studies 
projecting public spending, tax receipts and GDP far into the future. And the Yes and No campaigns have 
swapped widely different economic pictures of the consequences of independence.  
Yet many politically momentous events lie between now and these kinds of outcomes – not just the 
referendum itself, but also the writing of a Scottish constitution by a Constitutional Convention, the 
holding of the first post-independence general election, and the formation of a new Scottish government. 
Both the make-up of this Parliament and of the government may very well be different from the current 
SNP majority government. And of course, up to 2016, and long after that also, how Scotland progressively 
separates it government from the rest of the UK (hereafter, rUK) will be critical for the nascent Scottish 
state.  
Above all, voters in Scotland are not choosing at the referendum what kind of economy to develop, or what 
kind of welfare state or tax regime to live under. Those decisions will come later and be decided or varied 
at multiple stages. At the independence vote the only choice on offer is about what kind of state to live 
under, whether the status quo of the current UK, or the model of a fully independent Scottish state offered 
by Alex Salmond and the Scottish government. 
How the UK state operates is well known to Scotland’s voters. But how would a Scottish state work? How 
costly would it be to establish new institutions in the short term? How feasible is the transition process 
proposed? And how long would it take, and at what cost, to achieve the separation of Scottish governance 
completely from the UK? Above all, what are the long-term prospects for a Scottish state? How viable 
could it be, and where would it face its greatest challenges?   
These issues have only so far been addressed in the Scottish government’s White Paper Scotland’s Future 
(in a rather fragmented way), and in a series of UK civil service briefings discussing various detailed 
problems that an independent Scotland might face. The public debate has not really addressed these issues 
in a clear way. A UK Treasury briefing in late May 2014 did not help, containing as it did some 
spectacularly wrong information, which greatly muddied the waters.  
A subsequent rather visceral debate has been dominated by the pursuit of information from the Scottish 
government on the alleged ‘set-up costs’ of independence. Both the unionist parties in the Scottish 
Parliament, and UK ministers like Danny Alexander, have demanded that Alex Salmond produce cost data 
for things that could only have numbers attached to them by someone with the prophetic powers of the 
Delphi oracle. 
What we try to do here instead is to show what definite costs we can estimate will be incurred in the short 
term – these are genuine “set-up costs”. We also look at the longer term costs of achieving a transition to 
Scottish independence – using the timetables and commitments included in the Scottish government’s 
White Paper (which are the only ones available).
1
 Finally we offer voters a detailed estimate of the longer 
term viability of the Scottish state, based on the most up to date research in state theory. 
                                                          
1
 There are grounds for arguing that the swift transition envisaged from a Yes vote to an independent Scotland by 
March 2016 is unrealistic or unlikely to happen, and that some of the other, later timings envisaged would benefit 
from longer phasing. But so far the UK government has not made such arguments – only insisted that voters in 
Scotland will say No, and so the issues here are academic.  
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1. The key tasks in achieving a smooth transition 
The Scottish government have pledged to voters that their top priority will be to achieve a smooth 
transition to independence by March 2016. What that means in concrete terms is summed up in Figure 1 
where the seven really big things Scotland must do for itself are in the left-hand column.  
Figure 1: Major new departments or capabilities needed in an independent Scotland 
New Top-level departments or agencies 
needed 
 Other Scottish equivalent agencies needed (or 
radical expansion of existing functions) 
Defence Department plus 
Scottish Defence Force  
Single Economic Regulator (covering a wide range 
of markets) 
Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency Scottish Debt Management Office 
Foreign Affairs department, plus  
Embassies and diplomatic service 
Rural Payments Agency, and agriculture policy-
making competency 
Scottish Revenue Expanded Government Procurement capability 
Scottish version of Department of Work and 
Pensions (hereafter, DWP) 
Scottish Export Finance capability 
Scottish Passport Office Civil Aviation Authority equivalent 
 Oil and Pipelines Agency capability 
Contested need for: Scottish central bank BBC or Public broadcasting capability 
 
The kernel of a new Scottish Defence Force (incorporating army, navy and air force units) would need to 
be established. This will probably include around 10,000 personnel, plus a new Defence Directorate inside 
the Scottish government, perhaps involving around 3,000 staff (current Ministry of Defence staff in 
Scotland is somewhat more than this).  
A new, integrated Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency (SSIA) would need to be set up also, covering 
internal security, overseas intelligence gathering and electronic and cyber security. Following the 
Scandinavian pattern, it would work closely the national police force for Scotland, already established by 
the SNP government. 
Scotland would also need to create a foreign ministry and a core group of overseas embassies covering 
major countries, probably building out from existing overseas Scottish government offices. A full embassy 
network covering about 50 countries would come later. Initially many Scottish embassies might sit in UK 
or other EU countries’ embassies. 
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These are the only brand new agencies that Scotland will need. But in addition a large number of staff 
would transfer from the UK to the Scottish government. Just under 8,000 people work for the UK’s tax 
agency HMRC in Scotland (not all on Scottish taxes) – they would need to be incorporated into a greatly 
expanded Scottish Finance and Economy directorate.   
Some 9,500 staff work for the UK’s Department of Work and Pensions in Scotland, again not all on 
Scottish benefits alone. They would come under a greatly expanded Scottish government directorate 
covering social welfare alongside wellbeing and NHS in Scotland (already devolved). 
And finally the currently beleaguered UK Passport Office would need to transfer its Glasgow staff over to 
Scottish government control. 
Of course, modern government is not just about central government departments directly controlled by 
ministers. A lot of routine or technical work also goes on in agencies, separated from main departments, or 
in arms-length public bodies handling professional issues that we don’t want ministers to interfere in 
directly. So the big changes above are only part of the picture, and the rest is shown in the first two 
columns of Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Assessing the overall scale of reorganization involved in creating an independent Scotland 
state 
  
 
Types of organizations 
UK bodies 
relevant to 
Scotland 
Scottish 
bodies 
needed 
Top-level departments/agencies   8   6 
Other major bodies   6   6 
Medium scale bodies 49 40 
Small or tiny bodies 61 45 
Already operating on shared basis 39 
Clearly or probably not needed 43    
Total bodies        206        136 
 
Source: LSE Public Policy Group analysis of bodies listed at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-public-bodies-that-operate-in-scotland 
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This covers 206 departments, agencies and bodies that the UK government says currently handle Scotland 
matters. We have categorized these organizations as shown. The medium scale bodies spend some 
significant amount of money or implement services. The small or tiny bodies make up a third of the total – 
they do specialist tasks, or are just advisory committees. Many bodies are already operating on a shared 
basis with Scotland’s devolved government and so do not need major reorganization, as with most UK-
level NHS bodies.  
Much of UK government is highly elaborate and long-lived, however – so it is not at all clear that a 
Scottish government would need all these bodies. In fact, we have carefully considered the full list and 
concluded that 43 of them would not need Scottish government equivalents. We are also clear in some 
cases that issues handled by multiple bodies at UK level would require only one Scottish body.  
Our judgements in Figure 2 are not in any way the official choices of the Scottish government – but they 
do at least suggest that there is a considerable scope for ‘streamlining’ what gets done north of the border, 
compared to UK practice. In fact, we think that the 206 bodies listed would need no more than 136 Scottish 
bodies, of which less than 60 would be new and of any significant size at all. 
What will all this mean for central government within Scotland? Figure 3 shows that there is a big change 
in the scale of civil service, but not that much change in how it operates.  
Figure 3: The transformation of Scotland’s central government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finance Health & social 
care
Enterprise, 
Environment, 
Innovation
Learning 
& Justice
CommunitiesStrategy & 
External 
Affairs
International 
Relations and 
Defence
Culture, 
Communications 
and Digital
Environment, 
Rural Scotland, 
Energy and 
Resources
Justice, Security 
and Home 
Affairs
Law 
Officers
Education, Skills 
and Employment
Health, 
Wellbeing and 
Social Welfare
Finance and 
the Economy
Office of the 
First Minister 
(including 
transition issues)
Permanent Secretary Joint services
Scottish government now
– SIx directorates, with 5,000 civil servants
Scottish government in 2016
– Nine directorates, with perhaps 27,000 civil servants
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Currently the policy-making Scottish government operates with just 5,000 civil servants, using a modern 
and effective way of organizing called ‘directorates’, devised by Sir John Eldridge. In contrast to the 
deeply embedded ‘silos’ of Whitehall departments, Scottish government is currently run as a single 
organization using the same human resources and IT systems, but with six directorates. Beyond this core, 
there are other major agencies doing discrete tasks (like the Scottish prisons) that are separately managed.  
Each of the Scottish directorates usually works for several ministers with different policy briefs. The most 
senior ministers are called Cabinet Secretaries and always attend cabinet, while other ministers go as 
needed based on the day’s business. Most current Scottish cabinet meetings have around ten ministers 
present, and there are only a couple of sub-committees. This has proved a very effective pattern of 
government, with staff numbers held down, spending controls well managed and policy development 
generally at least as good as that in the UK. 
After independence the Scottish government plan to maintain their directorates, but to enlarge the number 
from five to nine, with the First Minister running a small policy directorate handling transition 
negotiations, and eight others. One of these will be wholly new (covering defence and foreign affairs). 
Three others are greatly expanded but drawing on some existing experience (foreign affairs, finance and 
tax, and social security). On the face of it, these plans are clear and modest, drawing on existing strengths 
and developing them. 
The Scottish cabinet would also be somewhat bigger, with probably around 15 people sitting around the 
table from 2016 instead of ten, and somewhat more sub-committees. But compared with all other OECD 
governments, which generally have around 15 separate ministries, Scotland’s nine directorates answering 
to around 9 top rank Cabinet Secretaries (and more ministers) still looks lean. It contrasts with the UK 
government that includes 120 ministers, with a cabinet of now 25. 
2. The timetable of transition 
The single best attested lesson of all public management is that the costs (and other risks) of a  speedy or 
forced transition are always greater than those changes that are properly planned, trialled and phased, so 
that effective implementation can take place at each stage.  
In a 2010 study we undertook of changes to Whitehall departments across 30 years we heard many horror 
stories of the incredible behaviour of UK Prime Ministers in forcing through badly designed changes of 
departments over a weekend. In one extreme case a top minister was two minutes away from arriving at his 
new department during a cabinet reshuffle and Whitehall reorganization, when the department was 
suddenly merged by the PM with another one. The minister had to be made Foreign Secretary to 
compensate him for the shock of it all. Especially under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown the pace of 
Whitehall changes became severely dysfunctional. 
In the Scottish case the government has actually set out in its White Paper a reasonable timetable for 
implementing changes, shown in Figure 4. The key decision that Salmond and colleagues have made is to 
move rather briskly from a Yes vote to independence, but to focus on just the key tasks already set out 
above. By 2016 Scotland will have policy control of some of the biggest issues, but even in defence its 
capability will only just be beginning, and no complete separation from UK systems is envisaged. 
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Even in important areas like defence planning, back office and procurement, and some taxes, it will take a 
considerable time for Scotland to build up its own systems. And in some technical areas, that matter a lot 
less for Scottish policymaking, the transition will take more than seven years. For instance, Figure 4 shows 
that the registering of vehicles and licensing of drivers carried out by DVLA and three other UK agencies 
will continue to be based in Swansea until at least 2021. 
So what would happen with things that have not been moved over to full Scottish control? The Scottish 
government will obviously want to brand and manage all its communications with citizens – so websites 
and forms would now carry the Saltaire and contact details for staff based in Scotland. But behind the 
scenes, for some years the ‘back office’ systems for both tax systems and benefits would need to run 
through the existing, very complicated computer and IT set-ups in the HMRC and DWP. And only when 
these systems were fully replaced with new Scottish ones would ministers in Edinburgh gain the full 
freedom to vary benefits for Scottish citizens (planned for 2018) and personal taxes in Scotland (planned 
for 2020). 
Throughout these longer transition periods then, how would Scotland continue to get the continuing 
services it needs from Whitehall? The details would need to be negotiated with the rUK, but in every case 
Scotland would have to pay the existing costs for these services, plus a small addition:  
- Either via a financial agreement between the two governments for whole sets of services to be 
provided. This would be the cheapest to agree on. 
- Or by Scotland contracting with the UK to get specific tasks carried out. This could be somewhat 
more expensive, since writing contracts in detail and then monitoring performance adds to costs. 
- Or by Scotland leasing whole sets of equipment, and even associated operating staff and support 
staff, for defined periods of time. 
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Figure 4: Timetable for the handover of functions to a Scottish state 
Date Major changes 
18 September 
2014 
Work begins on creating the Scottish Security and Intelligence 
Agency, the Scottish Defence Force and Defence policy 
capability, and a foreign ministry and embassy network 
September 2014 
to 2015 
Work on Scottish Constitutional Convention and on handover of 
staff, assets and transition arrangements 
Early 2015 Scottish government reorganized into nine directorates 
 
 
 
24 March 2016 
First election to independent Scotland Parliament. New 
government formed and announces policies for tax and welfare, 
plus priorities for transition. 
Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency takes over most 
responsibilities from rUK counterparts 
Scottish Defence Force in being with initial set of forces and 
agreed co-financing of some rUK services 
Scottish Defence Department capability operating, and growing 
Scottish foreign ministry in being and foreign service operating 
in around 50 countries initially 
By end 2018 Scottish directorate assumes full control over Scotland welfare 
benefits system, including new IT systems 
April 2020 Scottish Revenue how has full control of personal income taxes 
system in Scotland, including new IT systems 
 Scottish Defence Force nearing permanent configuration. 
Defence hierarchy and directorate has full control (or a full role 
in joint NATO control) of all essential systems 
May 2020 Second election to independent Scotland Parliament. New 
government formed and announces policies. 
2022 Scottish Motor Services Agency takes over DVLA and other UK 
motor related regulatory functions 
2020-22 Remaining tax functions and IT systems now fully controlled by 
Scottish Revenue 
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3. The costs of transition (and possible offsetting savings) 
The current debate about ‘set up costs’ for a Scottish state has been marked by the UK Treasury lumping 
together and in some cases grossly over-stating a range of very disparate kinds of administrative costs (and 
potential savings). As Figure 5 shows there are five main types of costs (and also potential savings) 
involved for Scotland here. 
Figure 5: The main types of costs (and offsetting savings) borne by Scotland and the rest of the UK 
during Scotland’s transition to independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PPG discussion with Scottish Government and Treasury officials 
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 13 
 
Transitioning to a new Scottish state 
 
Set-up costs  
are those incurred by Scotland only, in the early transition period (especially from a Yes vote to March 
2016) in duplicating a capacity that already exists in the UK. These costs are unavoidable, one-off costs of 
transition that create no additional or offsetting welfare gain for Scotland’s citizens. It’s important to note 
that set-up costs are just any increment added on to the existing costs of running equivalent UK services in 
or for Scotland. They cover just the legal costs of setting up a department, agency or public body, and any 
extra initial accommodation/IT costs, plus hiring in staff not needed before. They don’t cover the costs 
already incurred by the UK on running things in Scotland, because these costs are already being paid for by 
Scottish taxpayers. Most set-up costs will arise in defence, foreign affairs, tax and benefits. Based on 
detailed work on the costs of Whitehall reorganizations, and our analysis of major tasks set out above, we 
have estimated the set-up costs for Scottish government as being in the range from £150 million to £200 
million – that is £30 to £40 per person. 
 
By the same token, if Scotland can do the job the UK apparatus does with fewer or smaller bodies, then it 
can generate streamlining savings (to offset the set-up costs) of the kind outlined in Figure 2. 
Disentangling costs 
arise because current UK-run processes treat Scotland and rUK citizens in a merged way. Following a Yes 
vote, governments on both sides of the border will need to de-merge data about citizens, taxpayers, benefits 
claimants, business taxpayers and so on, and perhaps change some back-office operational processes so as 
to re-allocate them. The rational thing for both Scotland and London governments is do each of these tasks 
only once, so that the costs involved would be shared between them. How would the costs be allocated 
here? A good deal for Scotland would be its share of total UK population, where it might pay 10% and 
rUK 90% of the cost. A good sharing outcome for London would be a 50:50 deal. The differences here are 
large - so negotiation are crucial to the eventual number of Scotland’s costs here. Disentangling will likely 
generate some future savings by up-dating, modernizing, cleaning and authenticating data registers. 
 
Transition costs  
occur, as discussed above, when Scotland negotiates or contracts with rUK to keep doing part of processes 
that would cost too much to change during the transition period. Notice here though that only the extra cost 
of the contract negotiation and monitoring are new burdens borne by Scottish taxpayers – with unchanged 
systems the main bulk of services costs will be the same after independence as they were before.  
 
Investment costs 
have to be borne by Scotland in order for its policy makers to gain full control over the tax, benefits and 
defence areas, running all the back-office systems in a self-sufficient way. When the new Scottish 
government and Parliament has designed their tax and welfare policies for the long term, then Scotland can 
invest in modernized, purpose-built ICT and administration to permanently replace UK provision. And as 
the Scottish Defence Force builds up, they too can take over their own command and control, procurement 
and other complex back office functions. 
 
The UK Treasury has not given any specific numbers for defence, but they have put forward some large 
numbers about two other areas. They say: 
- the Scottish government would need to pay £400 million to create new IT systems and processes to 
handle all welfare benefits itself – which is targeted to happen by 2018 (see timetable above); and 
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- they would need to pay £500 million to create IT systems capable of handling all their tax 
administration – the main bulk of which is due to happen by 2020. 
These estimates are not based on any careful analysis, but given prevailing IT and change costs they do not 
seem implausible. 
However, these are not just ‘set-up costs’, because Scotland would be replacing older and complex legacy 
IT systems in each case, with newer, modern IT systems that would last for a long time (at least 10 years), 
and could well be cheaper and far more flexible to operate. Hence these are investments (not just set-up 
expenses) – like replacing an old desktop PC with modern iPad. The further down the track such changes 
are made, and the more tailored new systems are to Scottish ministers’ plans and priorities for tax and 
welfare, the more they have an investment and modernizing character.  
Bear in mind also that big scale IT systems and contracts run out all the time, and have to be renewed – and 
that in the past this has been a very costly and often rather shambolic process in UK government. Fully a 
half of all the UK’s major government IT contracts are up for renewal in the same period. So that Scottish 
taxpayers may well have to pay for much the same modernization spending, whether the nation votes Yes 
or No. 
Finally, there is good evidence around the world that supplying government IT is generally cheaper and 
more effective in small states of around 5 to 10 million people, than it is at UK scale (for 63 million 
people). New Scottish systems might well be smaller, more flexible and more modern than those in the UK 
– as they clearly are in Sweden, for instance. 
Policy cost savings 
would accrue to Scotland if they no longer needed to cover costs that have to be covered so long as they 
are in the UK, such as, the costs of running nuclear weapons systems. In 2013-14 the UK Ministry of 
Defence had costs of £47 billion (i.e. £thousand million), a sixth on which was capital spending, and the 
vast bulk on gross operating costs. The Scottish government anticipates spending only £2.5 billion a year 
on defence and intelligence combined. This is a lot less than Scotland’s population-proportional share of 
around £4 billion a year for MoD costs. Cumulated over a decade, such policy savings might quickly dwarf 
set-up costs. 
 
On the other hand, the Treasury argues that a leaked paper from Scotland’s finance minister, John 
Swinney, included a passage estimated that the annual costs of running the Scottish tax systems would be 
around £600 million a year. This is actually far higher than Scotland’s population-proportional share of 
HMRC costs, which would be around £300 million. The evidence basis for the Swinney estimate seems to 
have been slender, derived from looking at the proportion of GDP spent on tax collection in Ireland and 
New Zealand. It seems highly unlikely that Scotland would need to double HMRC’s costs. For instance, in 
taking on collecting a version of stamp duty and landfill tax Revenue Scotland recently considered a bid 
from HMRC, but decided it could do the job more effectively and cheaply on its own. So it is possible the 
£600 million number in the Swinney memo is itself just a mistake.  
Similarly there are one or two cases where the UK government has successfully pointed to higher 
transactions costs, a burden that would recur with each passing year. The most serious concerns the current 
easy co-operation between police forces on both sides of the border in pursuing and arresting criminals 
throughout the UK. After independence, current practice would become more cumbersome. English police 
forces pursuing criminals who have fled to Scotland would need to apply for European Arrest Warrants 
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(assuming that Scotland remains in the EU) to get them back, and vice versa for Scottish police pursuing 
suspects in England or Wales. At present the UK processes with other EU countries take a longer time and 
cost more to do. But since Scottish and rUK legal systems are much closer in their operations, the same 
might not be true with EAWs between the two. Similarly, it would be open to policy-makers on both sides 
of the border to consider new joint legislation to solve these problems if they proved serious. 
Finally, for completeness, an immediately successful Scottish state might face burdens from its own 
success. For instance, around 700,000 people born in Scotland now live in England, and are entitled to 
Scottish citizenship. If a lot of them were to apply for Scottish citizenship in 2016-17 the new Scottish 
Passport Office could confront major initial problems in getting to a stable initial configuration for their 
staffing and IT systems.  
 
4. Key examples of costs (and savings) 
To get more of an idea of the practical problems involved in the transition, we briefly discuss some key 
examples. 
The Scottish Security and Intelligence Agency (SSIA) is a priority area of spending for the Scottish 
government in 2014-16, and for the early years of independence (when Scotland may have difficulties 
spending its budget for defence). The new agency would replace three UK agencies in Scotland – MI5 
handling internal security; SIS doing overseas espionage; and GCHQ doing electronic eavesdropping. In its 
early years the new agency would no doubt work closely with these rUK counterparts. And there are strong 
reasons on both sides of the border why intelligence co-operation should be good, e.g. on countering 
terrorist threats.  
But the SSIA would also need to prove that it could be a reliable partner for intelligence agencies in the 
UK, and other countries like the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (who form the “five eyes” 
collaboration network). Until SSIA could prove that it could keep important secrets and also generate 
reliable intelligence information of its own, it could not be a part of these links on the same basis as the 
UK. The operations of the Scottish constitution in intelligence matters would also need to be established. 
Perhaps five years of effective operation would be needed for this situation to change 
On the other hand, Scotland’s risk profile in the intelligence area might well be much reduced compared to 
that of the UK. The Scottish government could draw on some significant talent in this area. And to start 
well it could afford to offer good pay and interesting opportunities to attract high calibre staff, and to fund 
state of the art equipment and facilities while its defence spending is building up. Finally Scotland’s 
national police force means that the SSIA would need to do a good deal less than MI5 in terms of 
homeland security. 
The Scottish Defence Force and Defence Directorate would have perhaps the hardest tasks of any. 
Scotland’s defence needs are heavily concentrated in capital intensive areas of spending, a navy to patrol 
its long coastline and extensive sea areas and oilfields, and an airforce to cover the country’s huge land 
mass and big northern air sector. The Scottish government envisage starting out with essentially two 
frigates and one fast jet squadron and a maritime patrol capability, and with a small army. Over the first 
term of the new Scottish parliament to 2020, these capacities would essentially double in size, and Scotland 
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would progressively take over (or integrate within joint or NATO structures) more of the command and 
control, back office and procurement systems from rUK’s Ministry of Defence. 
The Scottish Foreign Affairs directorate would build on the existing small external affairs capability, and 
could draw immediately on an existing overseas network of 27 Scottish trade delegations, many of which 
might be upgraded into embassies. The priority for overseas representation would be for Scotland to start 
out with key representation in international organizations, such as the European Union, NATO, the United 
Nations and so on. There would be complex negotiations to secure Scotland’s place in the EU and NATO, 
and the Scottish government could not assume that these would be easily or routinely assured. Equally 
appointing key ambassadors and getting overseas representation in 50 main countries would be a 
considerable challenge, but one for which Scotland could draw on an extensive talent pool. 
Taxes and benefits In many ways the most important problems might not lie with the brand new Scottish 
functions. Instead they might occur in the directorates controlling tax and social security, which would 
have large and often senior staffs used to the UK way of doing things, and not used to the Scottish 
government’s organization patterns and culture. As with many company mergers, getting new and old 
organizational cultures to mesh together could be a challenge.  
However, Scottish Revenue already exists as a new unit in Edinburgh and has already taken over the 
collection of a land fill tax and stamp duty equivalent. Equally, on benefits Scottish local authorities 
already handle all the administration of one of the most complex and costly of all welfare payments, 
namely housing benefits. 
The Debt Management Office for Scotland is an example of a smaller agency that none the less has a key 
function. In addition to taxes, states raise long-run borrowing by issuing bonds in financial markets, 
especially to fund investment spending and capital projects. The Scottish government intends to take on a 
share of the UK’s national debt (the size to be negotiated) and its DMO would at first undertake 
repayments and financing of these past liabilities. As it establishes a sound reputation in bond markets, and 
begins paying down its share of UK liabilities, so the DMO would be able to begin issuing new Scottish 
debt. Scotland has a great deal of financial expertise to draw on here.  
On the wider range of public bodies it is worth looking at just a couple of examples. First, to fund 
university research projects, the UK runs six different research councils, four in the sciences, one each for 
social sciences and the humanities, and one to do the biggest capital projects. In Sweden by contrast (twice 
as large as Scotland) there is just a single Research Council that runs all the same functions as the UK in 
one organization. This is an example of a medium size agency remodelling and the streamlining that 
should be feasible with a fresh canvas.  
Second, take a small public body like the Electoral Commission, which has a budget of £21 million and 
registers political parties and supervises how elections are conducted. Scotland would need only a very 
small equivalent body, a set of commissioners and a small staff, perhaps costing £2 million a year to run. 
There would be some set-up costs here, but they would be tiny – as for most of the public bodies covered 
in Figure 2 above. 
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5. Scotland’s assets (and liabilities) 
Before we leave financial numbers behind for broader issues, it is worth noting that after a Yes vote there 
would also have to be important negotiations between Scotland and London to divide up UK public assets 
(and also government liabilities like the national debt and pension costs). The general principles here are 
clear: 
- Fixed assets (land, buildings etc.) will generally ‘lie where they fall’, so that Scotland would 
acquire at zero cost all the UK government buildings, bases and land etc. within Scotland’s 
boundaries. 
- Unfixed assets, and fixed assets located overseas outside the UK, would have to be divided and 
Scotland given a cash amount by rUK to compensate it for that share. What would the sharing 
arrangement be? It could be population proportional, with Scotland gaining 1/12
th
 of the total. 
Scotland will seek to make a case for a higher share, recognizing the past importance of North Sea 
oil in creating the assets involved. 
 
Some Yes campaign arguments have tended to link the issue of transition costs to Scotland accruing large-
scale asset values. However, the point of government assets is to back up (provide a surety for) Scotland’s 
future ability to raise long-run government funding and undertake borrowing on bond markets at 
reasonable costs. Linking assets gains to transition costs tends to undermine that connection of assets to 
long-run government funding potential. It might suggest that the process of independence would lead to an 
imprudent diminution of public assets to meet one-off needs (similar to financing current spending by 
means of asset sales). 
Hence, the costs of transition and the dividing of assets should never be linked. Transition costs can be 
offset by savings in running costs (through streamlining, sound investment and modernization) and policy 
savings. Any cash-value receipts from rUK in respect of assets should be dedicated to long-run 
reinvestment that adds to Scotland’s overall asset base for the future – perhaps via a dedicated fund, or 
even a sovereign wealth fund? 
 
6. The importance of the post-referendum negotiations 
When a UK general election looms, all the main parties with a chance of being in government get a degree 
of access to the civil service, and to government documents and statistics, so that they can be briefed on the 
realities they would face, should they come to power. The aim is to help them put well-costed policies in 
place, before they begin making election promises to voters. 
Unfortunately, there has been no equivalent process for Scotland’s referendum, despite its momentous 
implications. Westminster ministers have instead given no information at all to the Scottish government or 
their officials. Whitehall has been forbidden to discuss issues with Scottish officials and to do any 
contingency planning for independence, in case the conclusions suggest independence would not cause 
major problems. (The only exception here is the Bank of England, where Mervyn King gave permission for 
its officials to hold technical discussions with Scottish planners.) 
Yet most of the information needed to understand the transition costs for an independent Scotland lies not 
in Edinburgh, but in London, where the reserved functions are administered. Indeed, how could it be 
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otherwise? By definition, none of the Scottish government’s 5,000 civil servants is an expert in defence 
spending, or running a full-spectrum diplomatic service, or designing and contracting for complex IT 
systems in policy fields for which Scotland has no legal standing at present. The Scottish government has 
hired some generalist planners, and convened some strong expert committees to prepare for transition, but 
without having detailed information or interactions with Whitehall. 
Ironically too, UK ministers like Danny Alexander, and unionist parties in the Scottish Parliament, have 
repeatedly pressed the Scottish government to specify transition costs that are many years down the track 
and will depend extensively on: 
- how Scottish voters choose MSPs in 2016; 
- which government is formed then; 
- what policy decisions Scottish MPs then make. 
 
Most important of all, these transition costs depend very heavily not just on the Scottish government, but 
on how the rUK conducts negotiations. London ministers could take a hard line that apparently cares little 
or nothing for the future welfare of Scottish citizens (as perhaps with their declared stance on monetary 
union). This would force through a complete transition quickly – even though such a course damages the 
rUK itself economically, maximizes costs in rUK government, and creates risks for rUK citizens. In this 
case Scotland’s transition costs would be much higher, and the risks of service gaps opening up would be 
greater. 
Yet if negotiations do become a tough poker game, the Scottish government still has some big chips that it 
might play. For instance, Alex Salmond has insisted that the Faslane nuclear submarine base must close by 
2020 – which he must know is an infeasible deadline for the rUK’s Ministry of Defence to meet. Similarly, 
the UK government has already had to announce to bond markets that in the event of Scottish 
independence it guarantees the whole of the UK’s existing public debt – so that (in theory) Scotland could 
launch debt-free as a nation.   
Alternatively, in negotiations London ministers could agree to share services with Scotland during a well-
phased and jointly planned transition period, disentangling services in an orderly sequence, with Scotland 
meeting the interim costs to UK taxpayers. This is what the Scottish government’s planning and White 
Paper essentially assumes. In this case Scotland’s transition costs would be much lower. It would have to 
spend mainly on new investments rather than on ‘set-up costs’, and the continuity of key services would be 
much better assured.  
Voters in Scotland will need to make up their own minds how they believe that things will play out in 
negotiations if Scotland votes Yes. Perhaps with the closing of some opinion polls, the time is also overdue 
for UK ministers to come clean on what exactly London’s stance would be if Scotland’s voters do decide 
to choose independence. 
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7. The long-run viability of a Scottish state 
Over many decades, how a state is set-up and how it works can have enormous implications for its society 
and economic well-being. In 1900 Argentina was one of two states with the highest levels of GDP per head 
in the world (the other was Australia). Yet decades of political corruption, Peronism, military coups and 
dictatorships and strong social inequality saw Argentina tumble down the GDP rankings throughout most 
of the twentieth century. 
Modern political science shows that running an advanced state now involves all the thirteen critically 
important functions shown in Figure 6. All of these components must be in place if the state is to succeed 
and flourish. In Scotland’s case most of the boxes already look fine. Those that remain to be established are 
shown by one star (denoting some extra capacity needed) or two stars (denoting major capacity needed). 
We comment briefly on each of the elements. 
Figure 6: Thirteen essential features of statehood – and the areas where Scotland needs to build up 
(shown by *s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ** Large capability gap to be made up in Scottish government   * Some capability improvement needed in Scotland 
Source: P. Dunleavy, 2014. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56492/ 
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A. The state as a stream of tax revenues underpins everything a government machine does. In Scotland’s 
case the Scottish accountants (ICAS) have produced a long academic report dwelling in a rather vague way 
on the complexities of running a tax system. But with a stable UK tax regime in place in the country for 
many decades, and plenty of strong expertise for the Scottish government to draw on, there seems every 
reason to believe that Scotland’s revenue stream will continue as before. Indeed ‘tax morale’ (the 
willingness of citizens or businesses to pay taxes) is likely to rise after independence. 
A1 The budgetary state concerns a government’s success in keeping spending in line with taxes and 
revenues for the long term. Scotland’s record under devolution has been careful and financial planning has 
been accurate. The relatively small addition of functions is unlikely to make any difference here, except in 
the defence area where procurement creates some new risks that will need to be carefully managed by the 
2020s. 
A2 The central bank-Treasury state covers the behaviour of states in issuing debt, managing their monetary 
affairs and guarding against systemic risks (such as the 2008 financial crash and recession). The Scottish 
government have successfully addressed the debt management issue, but proposes to rely on the Bank of 
England still for central bank functions. This can only work if London ministers have strong confidence 
that Scotland has the self-same efficacy in guarding against creating systemic risks of bank collapses and 
financial instability as the remaining UK does. 
A3 The development and environment state shapes both economic growth through infrastructure and 
environmental performance. Scotland has a good existing record on both fronts. If Scottish citizens become 
sole guardians of their world-famous environment we might expect ‘green’ consciousness and performance 
to improve relative to that of rUK. 
B. The constitutional-legal state shapes how its institutions and operation evolve. Scotland already has very 
strong rule of law and constitutionalism traditions, a strong concentration of legal expertise and excellent 
courts and judges. Its Parliament and government institutions are modern and based on proportional 
representation. Its local government (previously often one-party controlled and sometimes somewhat 
corrupt) has also been modernized by PR elections. The new written constitution to be defined by a 
Constitutional Convention should mean an independent Scotland has a top rating here. 
C. The organizational-bureaucratic state is also strong in Scotland, with strong public service and political 
impartiality traditions that have been stable for generations. Since devolution, governance arrangements 
have been stable and generally successful, with far less of the incessant ‘reform churn’ in England. 
Scotland has generally higher civil service morale (due to no redundancy guarantees in Scottish 
government), and a good overall record of maintaining efficiency, reducing public bodies and service 
modernizations (like the national police force). There seems every reason for this to continue. 
D. The information state is crucial to modern public management, and the devolved government’s 
performance has generally been solid if not spectacular. As we have seen, in taxation, benefits and defence 
a new Scottish state has key challenges to meet as discussed above, but also important opportunity to put in 
place more modern and flexible systems. For comparison, the UK’s record on government IT over in 
recent decades has been poor, with complex, legacy IT systems, high costs and major cancellations and 
policy disasters – most recently on Universal Credit. 
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E. The regulatory state is well set-up in Scotland for almost all social and economic issues, reflecting its 
legal soundness and public service strengths. The Scottish government proposes to establish a singe 
economic regulator, which should cut costs and improve policy cohesion. The only area of weakness 
concerns financial system macro-regulation (see A3 above). 
F. The welfare state in Scotland is already mostly operated by the devolved government, drawing on strong 
UK traditions and with some modernization. Handling social security raises some new IT challenges and 
policy issues, but the DWP local offices on the ground will transfer across. Welfare issues become 
somewhat less complex at a smaller scale and in a more defined set of area contexts. 
G. The security state is well established on the policing front, aided by recent reforms. Creating a new 
intelligence agency, and then developing its international reputation to grow co-operation with other 
countries are key challenges for an independent Scotland discussed above. The new written constitution 
might constrain the agency’s efficacy. Alternatively, it might help citizen and business confidence, by 
resolving the myriad privacy rights etc left largely unresolved in the UK’s uncodified constitution. 
H. The defence state is the most important area where a new Scottish government needs to prove itself. 
Attracting service personnel to a smaller, integrated defence force may pose difficulties. Yet Scotland can 
also draw on strong military traditions and a considerable pool of talent and motivation. 
I. The national identity state is crucially important for the coherence of a society around its governing 
system. Scotland’s existing sense of national and identity is very strong indeed, with a distinctive social 
culture that is world famous and a characteristic politics with limited internal factionalism. Key unifying 
institutions, such as the monarchy, would remain. The likelihood seems strong also that after a somewhat 
divisive referendum campaign, Scots would strongly pull together in the event of a Yes vote.  
J. The coalitional-bloc state is vitally important in modern world affairs, especially so for smaller states. 
Although great power incursions in Europe had seemed to largely recede, the recent Russian occupation of 
Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine over a long period show that significant threats remain for any 
isolated state, even in the modern world system. Scotland, however, has strong alliance positions within the 
EU and NATO, that will need to renegotiated, but do not seem to be in any long term doubt 
Summing up across all these dimensions, the future viability of a Scottish state generally seems high. Once 
some limited new capacities are developed, the prospects seem set fair for generally good governance over 
the long term. 
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Conclusions 
We can say with some confidence that Scotland’s immediate set-up costs are likely to be constrained – 
perhaps up to £200 million in creating new versions of a few but big existing UK department capabilities. 
Beyond that, the UK Treasury has cited a report based on Canadian studies that suggests a range of other 
transition costs – from as little as £600 million at the low end (0.4 of 1 per cent of Scotland’s GDP), up to 
£1.5 billion (1% of Scottish GDP) at the high end. This is a very wide margin, and the study itself was of 
Quebec some years ago, and not of Scotland now. 
The UK Treasury has also suggested that Scotland could face disentangling costs, IT and new 
administration costs in taxation and benefits of perhaps as much as £900 million. But if anything like these 
amounts were to be incurred, it would be in a phased way by the Scottish government creating new and 
modernized IT and administrative systems that would endure for many years. They hence take on the 
character of investments, where future running cost savings would also be sought. 
Scotland’s transition costs are also likely to be significantly offset by: 
- some significant ‘streamlining’ savings initially; 
- the elimination of many ‘legacy’ complexities (such as the very tangled back-office computer 
networks in UK tax and benefits systems); 
- the generally easier process of managing a smaller government machine;  
- some substantial policy savings in areas such as defence.    
 
The two absolutely critical influences on Scotland’s likely transition costs are:  
- the realism of Scottish government planning for independence, which generally seems high, but 
assumes a moderate and rationalist rUK stance; and 
- the stance that London ministers would actually take in negotiations over the transition, which 
remains largely undefined.  
 
The long-run viability of an independent Scottish state is generally high.  
 
  
 
